Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law
Journal
Volume 22 Volume XXII
Number 2 Volume XXII Book 2

Article 2

2012

The Indecency of Indecency: How Technology Affects the
Constitutionality of Content-Based Broadcast Regulation
Nick Gamse
Northwestern University School of Law, nick.gamse@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Nick Gamse, The Indecency of Indecency: How Technology Affects the Constitutionality of Content-Based
Broadcast Regulation, 22 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 287 (2012).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol22/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information,
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

The Indecency of Indecency: How Technology Affects the Constitutionality of
Content-Based Broadcast Regulation
Cover Page Footnote
Associate, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP. J.D., Northwestern University School of Law; M.B.A., Kellogg
Graduate School of Management. I would like to thank Bob Lebailly, Professor Rachel Davis Mersey, and
Professor Jim Speta for their invaluable guidance on this project. I am also very grateful to Professor
Michael P. Smith and the Media Management Center for providing the funding that made the study
possible.

This article is available in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal:
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol22/iss2/2

GAMSE.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2/14/2012 4:52 PM

The Ind ecency of Ind ecency:
H ow Technology Affects the
Constitutionality of Content-Based
Broad cast Regulation
Nick Gamse*
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 288
I. TECHNOLOGY, BROADCAST TELEVISION, AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT ...................................................... 291
A. The First Amendment and Broadcast Television ... 291
B. Cable and Satellite Television ............................... 295
C. The Emerging Quagmire: Broadcast Meets New
Media Technology .................................................. 297
II. METHODS ..................................................................... 305
III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS .............................................. 307
A. Should Restrictions on Broadcast Speech be
Subject to Strict Scrutiny? ...................................... 307
B. Are Media Filters like the V-chip a Less
Restrictive
Means
of
Achieving
the
Government’s Interests in Regulating Broadcast
Speech? .................................................................. 309
C. Improving Media Filters ........................................ 313
CONCLUSION................................................................................. 315
APPENDIX ..................................................................................... 316

287

GAMSE.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

288

2/14/2012 4:52 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 22:287

INTRODUCTION
In the thirty-plus years since FCC v. Pacifica Foundation1
revolutionized content-based broadcast regulation, much has
changed. Although broadcast television was recognized as a
dangerously pervasive medium in 1978,2 it is no longer the
dominant force that it once was, with the vast majority of
Americans now paying for subscription television services like
cable or satellite.3 While the Pacifica Court strove to support
parents in their struggle to protect their children from pervasive
inappropriate content by upholding the Federal Communication
Commission‟s content regulation,4 technological developments
like the V-Chip, cable boxes, DVRs, and satellite boxes have
afforded modern parents various self-help alternatives.
Many critics have argued that changes like these in the
convergent media environment have obviated any need for the
Supreme Court to evaluate the constitutionality of broadcast
speech regulations with special deference, or so-called
“intermediate scrutiny.”5 They contend that broadcast restrictions
should instead be evaluated like all other content-based media
regulation, with “strict scrutiny.”6 Some have suggested that no
content-based television regulation could pass constitutional
muster under a strict scrutiny test because new self-help media
filters like the V-Chip necessarily present a less restrictive means

*
Associate, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP. J.D., Northwestern University School of
Law; M.B.A., Kellogg Graduate School of Management. I would like to thank Bob
Lebailly, Professor Rachel Davis Mersey, and Professor Jim Speta for their invaluable
guidance on this project. I am also very grateful to Professor Michael P. Smith and the
Media Management Center for providing the funding that made the study possible.
1
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
2
Id. at 748.
3
NIELSEN, TELEVISION AUDIENCE 2009 1 (2010), available at http://blog.nielsen.com/
nielsenwire/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/TVA_2009-for-Wire.pdf. See also Innovation in
the Broadcast Television Bands: Allocations, Channel Sharing and Improvements to
VHF, FCC 10-196, ET Docket No. 10-235 at 38 (Nov. 30, 2010) (statement of Julius
Genachowski, Chairman, FCC) (noting that “less than 10% of Americans receive
broadcast television only through over-the-air spectrum signals”).
4
See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
5
See, e.g., Randolph J. May, Charting a New Constitutional Jurisprudence for the
Digital Age, 3 CHARLESTON L. REV. 373, 389–90 (2009).
6
See id.
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of controlling indecent or profane speech.7 These arguments have
found welcome ears in some courts, most notably the Second
Circuit. Upon hearing Fox v. FCC on remand from the Supreme
Court, the court pulled no punches in forcefully arguing that
changes in the technology landscape should unravel any special
First Amendment status for broadcast speech restrictions.8
Unfortunately, both law review articles and judicial opinions
that have lobbied against content-based broadcasting regulation
have generally neglected to offer specific empirical evidence to
support their positions. These critics tend to focus on how new
technology might be used in theory rather than how it is actually
used in practice. This approach is problematic. If the Supreme
Court is to uproot three decades of its broadcast speech precedent
(as it will have the opportunity to do when it decides the next
iteration of Fox v. FCC this term),9 it should do so on the basis of
specific empirical data that directly address the status of the
bedrock governmental interest from Pacifica: parental control over
their children‟s exposure to pervasive content.10 Thus, it is critical
to understand precisely how the changes in media consumption
and technology have affected these parents and their perceptions of
control. It is equally important to empirically distinguish between
the efficacies of the alternatives that the Court would consider
under a strict scrutiny analysis: one regime based on media filters
and another based on regulation.
Without such empirical
7

Indeed, this was precisely the position taken by the Fox television stations in the
Supreme Court‟s most recent indecency case, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (“Fox
II”), 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). Brief of Respondent at 45–48, Fox II, 129 S. Ct. 1800
(2009) (No. 07-582) (“The availability of the V-Chip renders the FCC‟s content-based
regulation of indecent speech on broadcast television unconstitutional.”). Law review
articles have also advanced this argument. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and
Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245,
303 (2003).
8
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (“Fox III”), 613 F.3d 317, 325–27 (2d Cir.
2010).
9
The Court agreed to hear argument specifically on the question of whether the
FCC‟s indecency regime is constitutional. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (“Fox
IV”), 131 S. Ct. 3065 (2011). Oral argument occurred just before this article was printed
on January 10, 2012. No. 10-1293: Proceedings and Orders, http://www.supremecourt
.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-1293.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2012).
10
See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
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considerations, it is impossible to accurately determine which
alternative is the less restrictive method of protecting children (or
whether the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has less
restrictive ways of accomplishing its mandate).
This study is the first to use actual survey data to examine how
technology has changed the perspectives of parents. With
generous funding from the Media Management Center at
Northwestern University,11 I conducted an original survey of 575
American parents to better understand their perspectives on the
intersection between television regulation and media filter
technology. Parental views are fundamental to the indecency
inquiry because they are at the core of the First Amendment carveout for the content-based regulation of television broadcasting.
The survey results offer clear empirical support for the argument
that the FCC‟s content-based regulation of indecent and profane
content should be deemed unconstitutional.
Broadcast television is no longer a uniquely pervasive threat to
parental control over what their children watch on television. The
survey data reveal that there is no statistically significant
difference in perceptions of control between parents who consume
only broadcast television in their homes and those who receive
their television through some other means of distribution (such as
cable or satellite). Moreover, there is not a statistically significant
difference between these two groups of parents in their perceptions
of how much exposure their children have to inappropriate content
on television. In other words, the data show that parents do not
perceive an underlying practical need for regulations of broadcast
speech to be measured with any less scrutiny than regulations on
other media. It is not a uniquely pervasive medium.
Second, parents overwhelmingly report that media filter
technology like the V-chip is at least an equally effective substitute
for government regulation of inappropriate content. This is a

11

The Media Management Center is Northwestern University‟s media education and
research entity, and is affiliated with the Kellogg School of Management and the Medill
School of Journalism, Media, Integrated Marketing Communications. See About the
Media Management Center, NORTHWESTERN UNIV., http://www.mediamanagement
center.org/about.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2011).
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striking finding that could justify the eradication of the FCC‟s
authority to regulate television content at all. Although most
parents would like to rely on a multifaceted defense comprised of
both technology and regulation, that position stands at odds with
the Supreme Court‟s strict scrutiny jurisprudence. If media filters
are just as effective as regulation at achieving the government‟s
interest of helping parents control what their children see, then the
regulations should be deemed unconstitutional abridgements of the
First Amendment.
This paper will proceed as follows. Section I briefly
summarizes content-based broadcast regulation in this country and
contrasts it with how other televised content is treated under the
First Amendment.
Next, Section II introduces the survey
procedures. The results are presented and analyzed in Section III,
with tables appended to this paper.
I. TECHNOLOGY, BROADCAST TELEVISION, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
A. The First Amendment and Broadcast Television
Congress created the FCC under the Communications Act of
1934, with a broad mandate to regulate broadcasting in the public
interest.12
Congress specifically tasked the FCC with the
responsibility of imposing penalties for “obscene, indecent, or
profane language.”13 However, the Act also included a provision
12
Communications Act of 1934 § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1937); MORTON I. HAMBURG &
STUART N. BROTMAN, COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.01[2] (Release 30 2011).
13
Communications Act of 1934 § 303(m)(4), 326, 501–02, 47 U.S.C. §§
303(m)(1)(D), 326, 501–02 (2006); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006) (“Whoever utters
any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”). The FCC defines
“indecent” content as “language or material that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
medium, sexual or excretory organs or activities.” FCC, OBSCENE, INDECENT, AND
PROFANE BROADCASTS 1, available at http://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/
obscene.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2011). Profane content is “language so grossly
offensive to members of the public who actually hear it as to amount to a nuisance.” Id.
However, it should be noted that the FCC‟s definition is the subject of pending Supreme
Court litigation. See Edward Wyatt, Justices Agree to Consider FCC Rules on Indecency,
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against censorship,14 underscoring the inherent tension between the
First Amendment and content-based broadcasting regulation.15
Because obscenity has long been held to be devoid of any
constitutional protection,16 the First Amendment battle is waged
primarily over regulation concerning indecency and profanity.
The First Amendment justification for this content-specific
regulation has changed over time. For many years, broadcast
speech was given special status amidst First Amendment concerns
related to spectrum scarcity.17 However, the spectrum scarcity
idea quickly became an anachronism in broadcast regulation,18
especially with the proliferation of cable19 and satellite
technologies, and, more recently, digital television. The Court has
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2011, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
06/28/business/media/28fcc.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Justices%20Agree%20to%20Consid
er%20FCC%20Rules%20on%20Indecency&st=cse.
Obscene content must meet a three pronged test:
(a) whether „the average person, applying contemporary community
standards‟ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (internal citations omitted).
14
Communications Act of 1934 § 326, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2006)
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the
Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications
or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or
condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which
shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication.
Id.
15
The two clauses have generally been interpreted together to imply that the FCC may
not impose prior restraint, but can issue fines for obscene, indecent, or profane speech.
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 736–38 (1978).
16
Miller, 413 U.S. at 36–37 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))
(“[W]e reaffirm the Roth holding that obscene material is not protected by the First
Amendment”). But see MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS 68–72 (1984) (generally critiquing the rationale behind the Court‟s obscenity
jurisprudence).
17
3 RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, SMOLLA & NIMMER & NIMMER ON
FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 26:3 (2011).
18
See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
200–08 (1987).
19
See id. at 239–47.
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acknowledged criticism of the scarcity doctrine,20 and while it
appears to have abandoned the theory, it has not explicitly done
so.21
In 1978, the Court defined its current stance on content-based
broadcast regulation in the landmark case of FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation.22 The case presented the Court with an opportunity to
determine whether the FCC had the authority to regulate the
broadcast of George Carlin‟s “Filthy Words” monologue on the
basis of indecency alone.23 The FCC emphasized that it only
intended to regulate indecent content that aired at a time when
there was a “reasonable risk” that children might hear it.24 Writing
for the majority, Justice Stevens upheld the Commission‟s
restriction of speech in this context.25 In so doing, he presented
two new rationales for why broadcast speech deserved more
limited First Amendment protection than speech communicated
through other mediums (namely print).
First, the Court emphasized the “uniquely pervasive presence”
of broadcast media in American society.26 The Court found the
threat of invasion of privacy into the home to be compelling,
especially because, practically, it was difficult for consumers to
heed content warnings when they sporadically tuned in and out.27
Second, the Court found that children were especially vulnerable to
the broadcast medium because it was so readily available and
could corrupt them “in an instant.”28 The Court was sympathetic
to the difficulties that parents had maintaining “authority in their
20

See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.11 (1984)
(acknowledging “increasing criticism” of spectrum scarcity, and requesting further input
from Congress or the FCC on the issue).
21
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 770 n.4 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing that the majority “refrain[ed] from relying on the notion of „spectrum
scarcity‟” to reach its conclusions); SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 26:22.
22
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729–38.
23
Id. at 729.
24
Id. at 732 (quoting Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C. 2d 94, 98 (1975)).
25
Id. at 751.
26
Id. at 748.
27
Id. at 748–49. This position has been interpreted as a rejection of the argument that
consumers could simply turn off programming that they found offensive. SMOLLA &
NIMMER, supra note 17, § 26:22.
28
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749.
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own household[s]” which were infiltrated by such a pervasive
medium.29
Over time, it has become clear that Pacifica‟s core interest was
a firm commitment to helping parents control the upbringing of
their children in the face of the pervasive cultural force of
broadcast television.30 Indeed, the Court‟s desire to protect
children from “harmful” speech was manifested in several of
Pacifica‟s contemporary cases.31 While the Pacifica Court was
careful to qualify that its nuisance rationale was limited and
heavily contextual,32 subsequent cases maintained a firm
commitment to protecting children. In Sable Communications of
California, Inc. v. FCC,33 the Court underscored Pacifica‟s focus
on children, and ignored any concerns related to negative effects
on the adult population.34 This treatment led some to speculate
that the Court would never approve a 24-hour bar on indecent
speech, since that would move beyond the protection-ofchildhood-innocence rationale that was paramount in the Pacifica
decision.35 Indeed, that hypothesis was borne out through the
Action for Children’s Television cases, where the D.C. Circuit
prevented Congress from compelling the FCC to regulate
indecency twenty-four hours a day.36 Instead, the court mandated
that the agency must allow indecent broadcasts during a “safe

29

Id. (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)).
See J.M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and the Foundations of Broadcast
Regulation, 45 DUKE L.J. 1131, 1136–39 (1996) (arguing that parental control is really at
the core of the pervasiveness and scarcity rationales, and is the only reason that could
justify separate treatment for broadcasting); Ashutosh Bhagwat, What If I Want My Kids
to Watch Pornography?: Protecting Children from ―Indecent‖ Speech, 11 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 671, 683 (2003) (writing that the state‟s interest in supporting parental
control has “proven entirely uncontroversial”).
31
See SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 26:23 (discussing these cases).
32
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750.
33
492 U.S. 115 (1989).
34
Id. at 127–28.
35
See SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 26:24 (discussing generally Sable
Commc‟ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)).
36
See Action for Children‟s Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504, 1509–10 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
30
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harbor” period between 10:00 PM and 6:00 AM, when children are
likely sleeping.37
The Court‟s Pacifica decision was steeped in the notion that
the broadcast medium was unique, and deserved less First
Amendment protection than other media.38 Later cases have
clearly articulated the lower degree of protection that broadcast
speech receives under the First Amendment.
In Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (“Turner I”), the Court
described its standard of review for content-based restrictions on
broadcast speech as “less rigorous” than its standards for other
media.39 Commentators have generally described this standard as
“intermediate” scrutiny.40 The Court has stated that it will uphold
a restriction on broadcast speech so long as the regulation is
“narrowly tailored to further a substantial government interest,”41 a
threshold that is significantly lower than the strict scrutiny inquiry
used for other media.42
B. Cable and Satellite Television
Content-based regulations on multichannel video programming
distributors (“MVPDs”) offering cable, fiber, and satellite
television have always been treated differently than restrictions on
broadcast speech. In United States v. Playboy Entertainment
Group, the Court drew a bright line between broadcast and cable
television specifically in the context of indecency regulation.43
Rather than revert to Pacifica‟s intermediate scrutiny test, the
Court applied a strict scrutiny standard to determine whether
sexually-oriented cable channels could constitutionally be required
to scramble their transmissions or limit transmission to hours when
37

Action for Children‟s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en
banc).
38
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (explaining that “of all forms of
communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment
protection”).
39
512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994).
40
SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 26:27 (discussing this “intermediate” standard
of review for broadcasting).
41
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984).
42
See infra Section I.B.
43
United States v. Playboy Entm‟t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000).
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children would not be watching (10 PM to 6 AM).44 Under a strict
scrutiny analysis, the government must show that its regulation is
the “least restrictive means” of “promot[ing] a compelling
Government interest.”45
In making its strict scrutiny assessment, the Playboy Court
repeatedly emphasized that media filtering technology associated
with cable could achieve the government‟s compelling interest of
helping parents keep inappropriate content from their children.46
The “key difference” between cable and broadcast television in the
case was that “[c]able systems have the capacity to block unwanted
channels on a household-by-household basis.”47 The Court ruled
that such technology was critically important to its First
Amendment inquiry because it could support parents while still
allowing willing consumers to partake in the speech that they
desired to receive.48 It summarily concluded that “targeted
blocking is less restrictive than banning,”49 and deemed the
scrambling restriction unconstitutional.50
Notably, the Court has used similar filter-based logic to knock
down regulations on Internet speech.51 While the Court has not
44

Id. at 808, 813.
Id. at 813 (citing Sable Commc‟ns. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
46
Id. at 815.
47
Id. It is worth noting that the Court has offered slightly different rationales for
distinguishing cable in the content-neutral context. In Turner I, a case that dealt with the
Cable Act‟s content-neutral must-carry provision, the Court focused on the “inherent
limitations that characterize the broadcast medium,” harkening back to the original
scarcity justification for regulating broadcast speech. 512 U.S. 622, 638–39 (1994). The
Court distinguished that there were no significant limits on the number of cable channels,
and no threat of signal interference. Id. at 639.
48
United States v. Playboy Entm‟t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000) (“[T]argeted
blocking enables the Government to support parental authority without affecting the First
Amendment interests of speakers and willing listeners–listeners for whom, if the speech
is unpopular or indecent, the privacy of their own homes may be the optimal place of
receipt.”).
49
Id. This very statement is now being used by some commentators to challenge
whether any content-based regulation on broadcast television is permissible. See infra
Section II.C.
50
Id. at 827.
51
Id. at 814 (“[T]he mere possibility that user-based Internet screening software would
„soon be widely available‟ was relevant to our rejection of an overbroad restriction of
indecent cyberspeech.” (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 876–77 (1997))).
45
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heard an indecency case regarding either satellite or fiber-delivered
television, it is reasonable to expect that they would also receive
strict scrutiny treatment because they offer similar filtering
capabilities.52 Although the FCC has not traditionally attempted to
enforce the Telecommunications Act indecency regulations against
MPVDs (including cable),53 the issue is not entirely moot because
Congress could simply legislate content-based restrictions on those
services as well. Indeed, there was a significant push to do so as
recently as 2005 (in the wake of the Janet Jackson imbroglio).54
Of course, any such attempt would surely receive a prompt
challenge in court, and the government would be required to show
that the regulation was the least restrictive means of achieving its
compelling interest.
C. The Emerging Quagmire: Broadcast Meets New Media
Technology
The question of whether the government can continue to
regulate broadcast speech more strictly than it can speech
distributed via other mediums has been called the “most important
First Amendment problem in the context of broadcast
regulation.”55
Modern technologies have helped create a
convergent media marketplace in which traditional media lines are
blurred and in which media filters like those discussed in Playboy
are widely available to parents, even for broadcast television. A
brief discussion of those changes will be helpful to more fully
52

See John C. Quale & Malcom J. Tuesley, Space, the Final Frontier—Expanding
FCC Regulation of Indecent Content onto Direct Broadcast Satellite, 60 FED. COMM. L.J.
37, 65–66 (2007) (arguing that any content-based regulation on DBS would likely be
weighed with a strict scrutiny standard, making it unlikely that any indecency regulation
could be upheld).
53
FCC, Regulation of Obscenity, Indecency and Profanity, FCC.GOV (last
reviewed/updated Mar. 1, 2011, 6:05 PM), http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/ (noting that the
agency has traditionally only enforced the Telecommunication Act‟s indecency
provisions against broadcasters).
54
See Frank Ahrens, Senator Bids to Extend Indecency Rules to Cable, WASH. POST,
Mar. 2, 2005, at E1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A64548-2005Mar1.html; Lisa de Moraes, CBS to FCC: Halftime Show
Finale Was a Surprise to Us, Too, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2004, at C07, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A35448-2004Nov8.html.
55
SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 26:4.
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address the overarching question of whether the FCC can still
justifiably regulate otherwise protected televised speech.
Perhaps the most significant development, at least insofar as
the First Amendment is concerned, is one that is now over ten
years old. Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress
mandated that all televisions larger than thirteen inches sold after
January 1, 2000 must include a V-chip.56 The V-chip technology
works with TV ratings in a manner that allows parents to block
shows that they disfavor (based on the shows‟ ratings).57
Nevertheless, while a V-chip is available in the vast majority of
televisions currently in use, only a very small number of
consumers actually utilize the technology. One 2007 study found
that while over eighty-two percent (82%) of parents had a V-chipequipped television, more than half weren‟t even aware their TVs
actually included V-chips, and only sixteen percent (16%) had ever
actually used one.58
Other important changes have also occurred in the media
environment. First, the percentage of families that use broadcast
signals for their television has plummeted. Fewer than ten percent
(10%) of families rely on broadcast transmissions for their
television.59 Instead, the vast majority of consumers now receive
their television transmissions via MVPDs like cable and satellite.60
These pay-TV services typically include additional filtering
capabilities for their customers.61 In fact, cable companies are
56

Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 551, 47 U.S.C. § 303(w) (2006).
FCC, V-Chip: Viewing Television Responsibly, FCC.GOV, http://www.fcc.gov/vchip/
(last updated July 8, 2003). The rating system was established as an industry initiative by
the National Association of Broadcasters, the National Cable Television Association and
the Motion Picture Association of America. Id. The ratings are as follows (increasing in
severity): TV-Y, TV-Y7, TV-G, TV-PG, TV-14, TV-MA. Id.
58
VICTORIA RIDEOUT, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, PARENTS, CHILDREN & MEDIA: A
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION SURVEY 9–10 (June 2007).
59
NIELSEN, supra note 3, at 1.
60
Id.
61
Adam Thierer, Why Regulate Broadcasting? Toward a Consistent First Amendment
Standard for the Information Age, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 431, 473 (2007) (“Parental
controls are usually just one button-click away on most cable and satellite remote
controls and boxes.”). See generally TVBOSS, www.thetvboss.org (last visited Nov. 17,
2011) (demonstrating a television industry initiative that catalogs the various parental
control options for cable and satellite customers); Parental Controls, TV PARENTAL
57
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legally bound to provide blocking devices to their customers upon
request,62 and most do so for free.63
Second, American children are now exposed to a wide range of
media that extend well beyond just broadcast television. One
recent study found that children ages eight to eighteen spend more
than seven and a half hours per day consuming media, during
which time they take in a whopping ten hours and forty-five
minutes worth of content (through multitasking).64 While video is
still the largest portion of their media consumption (four hours and
twenty-nine minutes per day), more than forty percent (40%) of
that video content is not traditional television; it “is either prerecorded or watched on such other platforms as computers, DVDs,
cell phones, or iPods.”65
Some prominent judicial opinions have explicitly suggested
that because of these changes in technology and media
consumption, broadcast regulations no longer merit special First
Amendment treatment. This position was recently advanced by
Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion in Fox v. FCC,66 and
even more forcefully asserted by the Second Circuit when it heard
the same case on remand.67 The case dealt with the FCC‟s
punishment of “fleeting expletives,” or unscripted profanity that is
transmitted during live broadcasts.

GUIDELINES, http://www.tvguidelines.org/parentalcontrols.htm (last visited Nov. 17,
2011) (offering similar information).
62
47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2) (2006) (“In order to restrict the viewing of programming
which is obscene or indecent, upon the request of a subscriber, a cable operator shall
provide (by sale or lease) a device by which the subscriber can prohibit viewing of a
particular cable service during periods selected by that subscriber.”).
63
Images Children See on the Screen: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Telecomms. & the Internet, 110th Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of Kyle McSlarrow,
President and CEO, National Cable & Telecommunications Association), available at
http://www.ncta.com/DocumentBinary.aspx?id=602 (stating that “leading cable
companies” serving more than 85% of the cable subscribers in the country had agreed to
provide blocking technology for free).
64
VICTORIA RIDEOUT, ULLA G. FOEHR & DONALD F. ROBERTS, KAISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION, GENERATION M2: MEDIA IN THE LIVES OF 8- TO 18-YEAR-OLDS 2 (2010).
65
Id. at 11.
66
Fox II, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1820 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).
67
Fox III, 613 F.3d 317, 325 (2d Cir. 2010).
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Although Justice Scalia declined to address the First
Amendment issue in the majority opinion,68 Justice Thomas
forcefully did so in his concurrence. He questioned the very
authority of the FCC to continue to regulate the content of
broadcast programming. He argued, as he had previously in
Denver Area,69 that there was no textual basis to alter First
Amendment protections across different media.70
Perhaps
accepting that this textual interpretation had not curried favor with
the rest of the Court, he proceeded to lay out a new argument as
well: that “dramatic technological advances ha[d] eviscerated” the
need for the Court to treat broadcast speech differently.71 He
specifically took aim at both the scarcity and pervasiveness
justifications, writing that the broadcast spectrum was no longer
scarce, and that broadcast television was no longer uniquely
pervasive since it had become just a small component of a
multifaceted media landscape.72
On remand, the Second Circuit took the baton from Justice
Thomas, pausing for a lengthy tangent to question whether the
Supreme Court‟s longstanding Pacifica doctrine should still be
valid.73 The court specifically highlighted the advent of new

68

The majority ruled that the FCC‟s decision to begin treating fleeting expletives as
actionable under its indecency policy was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Fox II, 129 S.
Ct. at 1812. The Court declined to address the lurking First Amendment issue because
the Second Circuit had not “definitively rule[d] on the constitutionality of the
Commission‟s orders.” Id. at 1819.
69
Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 812 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70
Fox II, 129 S. Ct. at 1820–21 (Thomas, J., concurring).
71
Id. at 1821.
72
Id. at 1821–22.
73
Fox III, 613 F.3d 317, 325–27 (2d Cir. 2010). The arguments presented by the
Second Circuit closely mirrored similar ones that it made in its initial opinion prior to
rehearing by the Supreme Court. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox I), 489
F.3d 444, 465–66 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009)
[I]t is increasingly difficult to describe the broadcast media as
uniquely pervasive and uniquely accessible to children, and at some
point in the future, strict scrutiny may properly apply in the context
of regulating broadcast television. . . . If the Playboy decision is any
guide, technological advances may obviate the constitutional
legitimacy of the FCC‟s robust oversight.
Id.
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media filters since the Pacifica decision came down in 1978,
noting that “technological changes have given parents the ability to
decide which programs they will permit their children to watch.”74
In no uncertain terms, the court found that these technologies
outmoded any need for broadcast speech to be given special First
Amendment status. The court explained, “[w]e can think of no
reason why [the Supreme Court‟s] rationale for applying strict
scrutiny in the case of cable television would not apply with equal
force to broadcast television in light of the V-chip technology that
is now available.”75 Although the court was not in a position to
overturn the Supreme Court‟s Pacifica precedent,76 this lengthy
denunciation of the doctrine in dicta was nevertheless an important
shot across the bow of the Court‟s broadcast jurisprudence. The
Court apparently took notice, granting certiorari in late June
2011.77
Criticism regarding the lack of synthesis between modern
technology and the Court‟s broadcast speech doctrine has not been
confined to judicial opinions. Several articles have similarly
contested that the nation‟s broadcast policy is woefully behind the
times, and that the advent of the Internet and digital media filters
should allow broadcast speech to be deregulated. These arguments
can be separated into two distinct camps. Some critics argue, as
did Justice Thomas and the Second Circuit, that broadcast
regulations should no longer be weighed with special intermediate
scrutiny, but instead deserve treatment under the more rigid strict
scrutiny test.78 Others go one step further, contending that the
proliferation of media filters like the V-chip inherently presents a
less restrictive means of protecting children from indecent
content.79 These critics believe that any FCC content-based
74

Fox III, 613 F.3d at 326.
Id. at 327.
76
Id.
77
See generally Fox IV, 131 S. Ct. 3065 (2011).
78
See, e.g., May, supra note 5, at 389–90 (writing that the Court should give
broadcasters the same First Amendment strict scrutiny protections as other media
sources).
79
See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 30, at 1155 (suggesting that because the V-chip gives
parents the ability to “protect” their children from unwanted television, “the government
should henceforth be forbidden from engaging in other content-based regulation of
75
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indecency regulation cannot survive a strict scrutiny test and
consequently should be deemed unconstitutional.
Surprisingly, there is little empirical data to support these
conclusions.80 Both Justice Thomas and the Second Circuit spoke
of technological change in general terms, but did not offer any
specific evidence about how those changes actually impacted the
control that parents had over indecent content, especially the
minority of parents who choose to have only broadcast television
in their homes. In order to properly determine if the Court should
continue to recognize broadcast television as a unique medium,
there must be some empirical consideration of how parents with
broadcast television feel about their level of control relative to
other parents.
Similarly, there should be an empirical
consideration of self-help technology alternatives like the V-chip
in order to make a decision about less restrictive methods of
achieving the government‟s compelling interest under the strict
scrutiny test.
At first blush, language from the Playboy decision seems to
suggest that the courts should not be concerned with how self-help
media filters are actually adopted or used for strict scrutiny
analysis. In identifying cable boxes as a less restrictive means to
control signal bleed from indecent programming, the Court stated,
It is no response that voluntary blocking requires a
consumer to take action, or may be inconvenient, or
may not go perfectly every time. A court should
not assume a plausible, less restrictive alternative
violence and indecency in the broadcast media”); Yoo, supra note 7, at 305 (arguing that
“the V-chip constitutes a less restrictive means sufficient to render any ban on indecent
speech unconstitutional”); Elizabeth H. Steele, Note, Examining the FCC’s Indecency
Regulations in Light of Today’s Technology, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 289, 307–10 (2010)
(calling for total indecency deregulation); see also Editorial, Content Regulation: An
Indecent Proposal, THE ECONOMIST, Jul. 21, 2005, at 54, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/4198412 (arguing that indecency regulation should be
abandoned entirely, in light of self-help technology and countervailing concerns about
government censorship).
80
Justice Scalia underscored this gap in his majority opinion in Fox II. While
declining to address the First Amendment issues that were present in the case, he noted
that the Second Circuit did not “demand empirical evidence” to support its pervasiveness
argument. 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009).
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would be ineffective; and a court should not
presume parents, given full information, will fail to
act.81
This striking passage has not gone unnoticed and has been
cited in subsequent decisions and law review articles arguing that
self-help media filters must be recognized as a less restrictive
means of controlling indecent content.82 However, a more careful
analysis shows why it is wrong to interpret the Playboy decision to
mean that the mere existence of any media filters presents a de
facto bar against government media indecency regulation;
empirical data must be considered if it is available.
To start, it is clear that the Playboy Court was willing to
examine data in order to determine whether blocking technology
could be construed as a “plausible” or “effective” alternative to
regulation.83 The Court‟s statement that it would not make
assumptions about consumer behavior was largely driven by the
fact that the government failed to provide it with any comparative
evidence that went beyond mere “anecdote and supposition.”84
The Court lamented that “[t]he record [was] silent as to the
comparative effectiveness of the two alternatives.”85 Under the
strict scrutiny standard, the government had a burden to show that
its regulation was a less restrictive means of achieving the
compelling interest of protecting children, a burden that it failed to
meet.86 But its failure should by no means be construed to imply
that it did not have the ability to present evidence about the extent

81

United States v. Playboy Entm‟t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 824 (2000).
See, e.g., Fox I, 489 F.3d 444, 465–66 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 129
S. Ct. 1800 (2009); Tom W. Bell, Free Speech, Strict Scrutiny, and Self-Help: How
Technology Upgrades Constitutional Jurisprudence, 87 MINN. L. REV. 743, 773 n.167
(2003); Yoo, supra note 7, at 303–04.
83
See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 824; see also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004)
(suggesting that the proper test is “whether the challenged regulation is the least
restrictive means among available, effective alternatives”). This language from Ashcroft
serves as further proof of the Court‟s willingness to consider evidence about the efficacy
of the various proposed means of achieving the compelling interest.
84
Playboy, 529 U.S. at 822, 824.
85
Id. at 826.
86
Id.
82
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to which the alternatives were more or less restrictive, or more or
less effective at achieving the compelling interest at stake. It did.
Other recent cases similarly support the conclusion that the
Court should rely heavily upon empirical evidence when
evaluating the constitutionality of speech regulations.
A
comparison to the Court‟s treatment of must-carry restrictions in
Turner I87 and Turner II88 is illustrative. In Turner I, the Court
determined that the record was insufficient for it to make a proper
assessment of whether must-carry provisions were constitutional
under intermediate scrutiny.89 It therefore remanded the case to
the District Court for the District of Columbia for additional factfinding.90 With more data to consider in Turner II, the Court
reviewed the expanded record to determine “whether the mustcarry provisions were designed to address a real harm, and whether
those provisions [would] alleviate [that harm] in a material way.”91
In sum, the Turner cases suggest that courts should rely on
empirical data for both intermediate and strict scrutiny First
Amendment determinations, and should not hesitate to remand if
the factual record does not provide sufficient information.92
87
88
89

Turner I, 512 U.S. at 622 (1994).
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (“Turner II”), 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
Turner I, 512 U.S. at 667–68
Because of the unresolved factual questions, the importance of the
issues to the broadcast and cable industries, and the conflicting
conclusions that the parties contend are to be drawn from the
statistics and other evidence presented, we think it necessary to
permit the parties to develop a more thorough factual record, and to
allow the District Court to resolve any factual disputes remaining,
before passing upon the constitutional validity of the challenged
provisions.

Id.
90

Id. at 668.
Turner II, 520 U.S. at 195.
92
See Note, Deference to Legislative Fact Determinations in First Amendment Cases
After Turner Broadcasting, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2319 (1998). To the extent that
Congress has provided specific interpretations of data in support of content-neutral
regulations, the Court will frequently heed those interpretations. See Turner II, 520 U.S.
at 224 (“We cannot displace Congress‟ judgment respecting content-neutral regulations
with our own, so long as its policy is grounded on reasonable factual findings supported
by evidence that is substantial for a legislative determination.”). Justice Breyer
expounded upon this point in his recent Brown dissent, arguing that the Court has a
history of deferring to the factual findings of the legislature, and contending that the
91
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Finally, it should be a matter of common sense that courts
would be willing to evaluate data regarding competing alternatives
under a strict scrutiny assessment. It would be illogical to ignore
reliable data that could help to make a more informed comparison
between technology and the regulation it might supplant,93 at least
when such data is available.94 After all, there are scores of
conceivable reasons why a media filter might not be deemed an
effective alternative to regulation: it might be inordinately complex
to use, prohibitively expensive to procure, or obscure and
unavailable for widespread use. The point is that any honest
analysis of the extent to which new technology can be an adequate
substitute for content regulation must consider data about its
adoption and efficacy in practice.
II. METHODS
In early 2011, I delivered an online survey to a random sample
of 575 parents who had children under the age of eighteen living at
home. The survey included questions on a range of topics related
to technology and media regulation. Parents are the most
appropriate survey target for this kind of analysis because they are
the population that Pacifica aimed to assist; the government
interest at stake deals directly with facilitating parental control
over their children‟s exposure to indecent media.95
The
Court should have done so in the case of regulations regarding violent video games.
Brown v. Entm‟t Merchs. Ass‟n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2770 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
But his was the minority view in that case. The majority decision tilted in the other
direction, suggesting that the Court will instead make its own independent assessment of
the data. Id. at 2738–39 (discussing the shortcomings of California‟s factual showing
regarding video game violence).
93
See Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 8 (1998) (arguing that the Court‟s constitutional jurisprudence would be more
aligned with reality if there were closer attention paid “to the likely consequences of its
decisions and to the empirical assumptions underlying its doctrines”).
94
See Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 21
(1998) (describing “the lack of an empirical footing” as the “Achilles heel of
constitutional law,” but noting that in some cases, “ignorance is irremediable”).
95
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749–50 (1978) (underscoring the
government‟s interest “in the „well-being of its youth‟ and in supporting „parents‟ claim
to authority in their own household‟”) (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
637–41 (1968)). See also Balkin, supra note 30, at 1137–39 (explaining the fundamental
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government has no interest in regulating indecent content that
parents want their children to see.96 Thus, parents are the frontline arbiters and are best able to gauge how pervasive television
content is to children in modern American homes, and whether
self-help technology like media filters is an effective solution to
keep this unwanted indecent content at bay.
Although the sample was random, whites were overrepresented
in the respondent population. Eighty-two percent (82%) of
respondents identified as white. Because there was a statistically
significant relationship between race and perspectives on media
regulation for some questions, I weighted the data to reflect a more
representative racial distribution.97
I then analyzed the data, frequently employing the Pearson Chi
Square test. This test is one of the most common methods of
statistical analysis used to evaluate the probability that the
connection between two categorical variables is due to an actual
relationship and not the product of random chance.98 The survey
had a margin of error of plus or minus four percent (+/- 4%).99

importance of parental control in justifying content-based regulation for broadcast
media).
96
United States v. Playboy Entm‟t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000) (noting that
“the Government disclaims any interest in preventing children from seeing or hearing
[Playboy‟s programming] with the consent of their parents”).
97
The data were weighted so that the racial breakdown was sixty-five percent (65%)
white and thirty-five percent (35%) non-white, consistent with the most recent Census
data available. U.S. Census Bureau, B03002. Hispanic or Latino Origin by Race, 2009
American Community Survey, CENSUS.GOV, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/
TTable?_bm=y&-ds_name=ACS_ 2009_1YR_G00_&-_geoSkip=0&-CONTEXT=dt&mt_name=ACS_2009_1YR_G2000_C03002&-redoLog=false&-_skip=0&-geo_id=010
00US&-_showChild=Y&-format=&-_lang=en&_toggle=ACS_2009_1YR_G2000_C030
02 (last visited Nov. 15, 2011). This weighting had a marked effect on the political
affiliation of the respondents. Although the survey originally yielded twenty-nine percent
(29%) Republican, twenty-nine percent (29%) Democrat, and twenty-three percent (23%)
Independent, after the racial weighting, the breakdown shifted to twenty-five percent
(25%) Republican, thirty-five percent (35%) Democrat, and twenty-two percent (22%)
Independent. For more background on weighting in survey research, see ALAN
BUCKINGHAM & PETER SAUNDERS, THE SURVEY METHODS WORKBOOK: FROM DESIGN TO
ANALYSIS 119 (2004).
98
BUCKINGHAM & SAUNDERS, supra note 97, at 241.
99
As with all studies, the margin of error fluctuates with each specific question,
especially those that were only answered by a subset of the total sample.
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The numbers that follow in Part IV generally are percentages of
valid responses only, excluding responses such as “don‟t know”
and “prefer not to answer.”100
III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Should Restrictions on Broadcast Speech be Subject to Strict
Scrutiny?
The first important question to answer is whether broadcast
television is still the unique medium it was in 1978 when the Court
decided Pacifica. The empirical answer appears to be that it is not.
Several different metrics from this study suggest that broadcast
should no longer be singled out for its privileged degree of
intermediate scrutiny.
First, there was no statistically significant relationship between
television delivery type and parental satisfaction with control over
unwanted television content.101 In other words, parents do not
seem to think that broadcast television is a uniquely pervasive
medium, relative to other delivery channels (cable, satellite, or
fiber). There was only an eight percent (8%) difference in
satisfaction with control between parents who received their
television signal only via broadcast (“broadcast parents”),102 and
those who received it via other means (“non-broadcast parents”);
seventy-seven percent (77%) and eighty-five percent (85%) were
100

I have noted instances where the percentage of non-valid responses was over ten
percent (10%).
101
See infra Table 1. Note that the racial weighting may have had a disproportionate
effect on this result because all non-white respondents who received broadcast signals
said that they were satisfied or very satisfied with their control. If the comparison is
made without weighting, then the relationship is significant at the ten percent (10%)
level, but is still arguably insubstantial, as there is only a ten percent (10%) difference in
satisfaction with control. Furthermore, there is not a statistically significant difference
between whites and non-whites in satisfaction with control across all television delivery
channels, which suggests that the skewed response to that particular question among the
non-white broadcast set was just an enigma.
102
Eleven percent (11%) of respondents in this study reported that they received the
television signal in their homes via broadcast. However, some of these respondents also
used other delivery mechanisms for their television content. Seven percent (7%) of
respondents stated that they relied upon broadcast only for their television.
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satisfied, respectively.103 Thus, the study suggests that the
perception of parental control is nearly identical between parents
whose children watch programming that is regulated by the FCC
and those whose children watch programming that is not.104
Second, there was no statistically significant relationship
between television delivery type and parental concerns about
inappropriate content exposure. Broadcast parents did not have
significantly unique concerns about the amount of adult language,
sexual content, or violent content to which their children were
exposed on television, whether taken individually or grouped
together as “inappropriate content.”105 In fact, the differences in
ratings were so small that the results for some of these
comparisons were about as statistically insignificant as can
possibly be calculated.106 Furthermore, these parental feelings
were not merely similar across television delivery alternatives; the
percentages of concerned parents from my study were comparable

103
See infra Table 1. On the other hand, there was a statistically significant
relationship between television delivery type and parental satisfaction with the
government‟s regulation of unwanted programming. Parents who received broadcast
only were much more likely to be dissatisfied with the government‟s regulation of
television programming. However, it would be inappropriate to answer the First
Amendment question based on opinions regarding regulatory satisfaction; that would be
akin to putting the cart before the horse. The Pacifica logic is based upon notions of
parental control, so responses regarding their perceptions of control should be
determinative here.
104
The FCC currently only imposes content-based fines on broadcasters. FCC,
Regulation, supra note 52 (“With respect to cable and satellite services, Congress has
charged the Commission with enforcing the statutory prohibition against airing indecent
programming „by means of radio communications.‟ The Commission has historically
interpreted this restriction to apply to radio and television broadcasters, and has never
extended it to cover cable operators. In addition, because cable and satellite services are
subscription-based, viewers of these services have greater control over the programming
content that comes into their homes, whereas broadcast content traditionally has been
available to any member of the public with a radio or television.”).
105
See infra Table 2. Overall, seventy-eight percent (78%) of parents were concerned
or very concerned about exposure to violent content, eighty-one percent (81%) about
exposure to sexual content, and seventy-three percent (73%) about exposure to adult
language.
106
See infra Table 2. For instance, the Fisher‟s Exact test result for violent content was
0.999999999999786, implying that there is only a 0.0000000000324% chance that the
data support a finding of a relationship between television delivery and concerns about
television exposure to violence.
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to those from a recent Kaiser study that asked parents about all
media exposure (including, for example, the Internet).107
Thus, while the FCC continues to impose fines on broadcasters
under the guise that the medium is pervasive and is uniquely
accessible to children, the statistics suggest that broadcast
television has truly become a homogenous part of the media
landscape. The longstanding Pacifica principle that broadcasting
is different lacks any significant empirical support among parents
in this study. Therefore, if the Supreme Court were to hear a
challenge to content-based restrictions on broadcast television, it
should close the book on Pacifica and its special intermediate
scrutiny carve-out, and apply a traditional strict scrutiny test
instead.
B. Are Media Filters like the V-chip a Less Restrictive Means of
Achieving the Government’s Interests in Regulating Broadcast
Speech?
Having established that regulations on broadcast television
should be evaluated using strict scrutiny, the logical next question
is whether the proliferation of media filters like the V-chip presents
a less restrictive means than regulation to protect children from
indecent or profane television content. The empirical answer from
this study is a nuanced yes. While parents would generally prefer
to have both media filters and government regulation, they admit
that the filters are just as effective as regulation by itself.
Therefore, if asked to apply a strict scrutiny test, the Court should
rule that it is unconstitutional for the FCC to continue to regulate
either indecency or profanity on television.
As a preliminary matter, the data support earlier findings that
the V-chip suffers from inadequate public awareness and
adoption.108 Only fifty-nine percent (59%) of respondents had
heard of the V-chip before taking this survey. While eighty-six
107
See RIDEOUT, supra note 58, at 24 (reporting that eighty percent (80%) of parents
were somewhat concerned or very concerned about exposure to violent content, seventyseven percent (77%) about sexual content, and seventy-seven percent (77%) about adult
language).
108
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, PARENTS AND THE V-CHIP 2001: A KAISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION SURVEY 1 (2001); RIDEOUT, supra note 58, at 9–10.
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percent (86%) of respondents had purchased a TV since January 1,
2000 (when the V-chip rule went into effect), only thirty-eight
percent (38%) of them knew that their TV had a V-chip, and only
15% of them reported that their family had ever actually used the
V-chip. These figures are especially striking considering that
when the device was first conceived, seventy-two percent (72%) of
Americans said they would use a V-chip “often” or “once in
awhile” if they had the technology.109 Comparing these numbers
to those from Kaiser‟s 2007 study, it seems that general awareness
of the V-chip has decreased (from seventy percent (70%) to fiftynine percent (59%)), although the usage percentages are still
approximately the same among those with equipped televisions.110
Those who actually use their V-chip technology are quite content;
ninety-eight percent (98%) of respondents who had used a V-chip
said it was either “somewhat useful” or “very useful” in helping
them filter inappropriate content from their children.111 But the
overarching problem remains: with the majority of Americans
unaware that their TVs have V-chip technology, it is a stretch to
believe that the V-chip alone is a realistic alternative to regulation.
However, the V-chip does not exist in a vacuum, and many
other media filters have sprung up in its wake. More than sixtythree percent (63%) of the survey respondents reported that they
had some other filtering device that they could use to block
unwanted programming (whether a cable box, DVR, satellite box,
or something else).112 In contrast to the V-chip‟s poor usage,
seventy-one percent (71%) of cable box owners had used their
devices, along with seventy-seven percent (77%) of DVR owners,
sixty-three percent (63%) of satellite box owners, and thirty-four

109
JEFFREY D. STANGER & NATALIA GRIDINA, ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER,
MEDIA IN THE HOME 1999: THE FOURTH ANNUAL SURVEY OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN 24
(1999).
110
See RIDEOUT, supra note 58, at 19; infra Table 3. It appears as though V-chip
awareness may have peaked in 2007. This is likely attributable at least in part to growth
of media filter alternatives (such as DVRs).
111
See infra, Table 4.
112
This figure does not include another ten percent (10%) of respondents who were not
sure. Excluding those respondents, over seventy-three percent (73%) said they had
another filtering device.
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percent (34%) of owners with some other filtering device.113
Moreover, seventy percent (70%) of cable box owners found their
device to be at least a “somewhat useful” means of blocking
programming that they did not want their children to see, along
with seventy percent (70%) of DVR owners, sixty-seven percent
(67%) of satellite box owners, and forty-seven percent (47%) of
other device owners.114 Thus, these separate devices were used
much more widely than the V-Chip, although they were also found
to be less helpful. This is likely due to the fact that the devices are
less utility-focused than the V-chip because they are not designed
solely for the purpose of filtering unwanted programming.
Nevertheless, in spite of their prevailing satisfaction with filter
technology, the majority of respondents stated that they still
wanted the government to continue to regulate broadcast content.
More than sixty-five percent (65%) wanted continued regulation of
obscenity and indecency, and more than sixty percent (60%)
wanted continued regulation of profanity.115 Only about eighteen
percent (18%) of respondents thought that the government should
relax obscenity and indecency restrictions because of technology,
and only about twenty-one percent (21%) for profanity; the
remainder thought regulations should be relaxed for other
reasons.116 Broadcast television users did not have significantly
different responses to these questions than the MPVD users.
Most importantly however, eighty-one percent (81%) of
respondents thought that technology like the V-chip was an equally
effective or better alternative to government regulation for
controlling the programming that they did not want their children
to watch.117 This finding is damning for content-based broadcast
113

See infra Table 4.
See infra Table 4.
115
See infra Table 5. The number of invalid responses was particularly high for this
line of questions; nearly twelve percent (12%) of respondents did not have an opinion on
this subject. For a hypothesis as to why that might be the case, see infra Section IV(c).
116
See infra Table 5.
117
See infra Table 6. As with the prior data, there was a high number of invalid
responses because a significant number of respondents (17%) answered “don‟t know.” It
is important to remember that these responses were given in a world in which the
government does regulate. To some extent, that might implicate the extent to which these
individuals are able to fully envision the implications of a world devoid of regulation. On
114

GAMSE.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

312

2/14/2012 4:52 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 22:287

regulation. The parents that Pacifica strove to assist seem to think
that its regulatory progeny is less effective than less-restrictive
self-help media filter alternatives.
The strong response to this question is especially noteworthy
when considered in light of prior research that has shown that a
significant majority of adults believe that parents, rather than the
federal government, should be primarily responsible for screening
inappropriate content from their children.118 It appears that parents
now have the technological capability, and the resulting burden, to
do so.119
Some may find this answer to be incongruent with the proregulation survey responses discussed above. On one hand, most
parents say that they want continued content-based government
regulation of broadcast television,120 in spite of new media filter
technology. On the other hand, the vast majority of parents say
that the new technologies are at least as effective as government
regulation.121 This tension is reflective of the extent to which
majoritarian parental perspectives stand at odds with the minorityprotective First Amendment strict scrutiny test. While parents may
have an “any means necessary” mentality when it comes to
protecting their children from objectionable content, that position
is incongruent with the “least restrictive means” standard used by
the Supreme Court. Put another way, content-based restrictions
could always inch cumulatively closer towards fulfilling a
compelling government goal, but the Supreme Court‟s First
Amendment strict scrutiny test imposes a limit. The Court
explained this distinction in Ashcroft:

the other hand, respondents might have been aware that cable and satellite programming
is not regulated for indecency or profanity.
118
PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, NEW CONCERNS ABOUT INTERNET
AND REALITY SHOWS: SUPPORT FOR TOUGHER INDECENCY MEASURES, BUT WORRIES
ABOUT GOVERNMENT INTRUSIVENESS 2 (Apr. 19, 2005), http://people-press.org/
reports/pdf/241.pdf. The margin in this particular study was about twenty-to-one.
119
Bell, supra note 81, at 778 (noting that “each time that courts . . . limit state action,
they impose on each of us the responsibility for adopting the new and improved self-help
technologies that render such state action obsolete”).
120
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
121
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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The purpose of the test is to ensure that speech is
restricted no further than necessary to achieve the
goal, for it is important to ensure that legitimate
speech is not chilled or punished. For that reason,
the test does not begin with the status quo of
existing regulations, then ask whether the
challenged restriction has some additional ability to
achieve Congress‟ legitimate interest.
Any
restriction on speech could be justified under that
analysis. Instead, the court should ask whether the
challenged regulation is the least restrictive means
among available, effective alternatives.122
Because parents recognize that media filters like the V-Chip
are a more effective method of controlling objectionable television
content, and because the V-Chip and other media filters are now
widely available, the regulatory alternative of content-based
penalties should be considered unconstitutional.
C. Improving Media Filters
In looking for a more robust understanding of parental
perspectives on technology and media regulation, one concept to
consider is what I term “consumer transparency.” The television
filters and regulations that are most successful are those that are
obvious or transparent to consumers through their ordinary TV
consumption. The media filters and regulations that are less
obvious appear to be less helpful.123
The consumer transparency hypothesis can offer insight into
several different aspects of this survey. For instance, a significant
majority of respondents were familiar with the national TV rating
system. About seventy-eight percent (78%) thought that the
ratings were a good idea. This could be because the ratings have a
high degree of consumer transparency because they appear at the
start of every TV show. In contrast, there is less consumer
122

Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004).
It is important to note that the data do not dispositively support a consumer
transparency theory. This is simply a hypothesis intended to bring some cohesion to the
survey results.
123
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transparency about who actually sets the ratings; only forty-four
percent (44%) of the survey respondents correctly answered that
the television industry bears that responsibility. This regulatory
ambivalence (or apathy) was also evident in some questions asking
for perspectives about regulation.
Throughout the study,
significantly more respondents answered “don‟t know” to
questions about regulation than to those about respondent behavior
or perceptions of control.
The consumer transparency hypothesis extends to devices as
well. In spite of the fact that the V-chip is the most widelydistributed media filter (included in virtually every television on
the market since 2000),124 it is far from being the most wellknown. Significantly more parents were familiar with media filter
devices that are required for ordinary operation of a television
(such as a cable box) than the less-obvious V-chip that has
continued to remain shrouded from consumers.
The hypothesis can also help to explain consumer responses
regarding the intricacies and regulation of television delivery
systems. For example, the differences between the broadcast and
cable viewing experiences are largely imperceptible.125 Although
the Playboy Court distinguished between delivery systems by
noting that cable companies can filter their signals on a householdby-household basis,126 that difference is not obvious to the viewer.
Nearly twenty-five percent (25%) of cable customers in the survey
did not know that they could request that a channel to be cut off by
their service provider. Furthermore, most cable customers have no
input on the basic set of channels they receive due to the cable
industry‟s tiered pricing structure. The lack of a transparent
difference between delivery systems could be one reason why
124

FCC, supra note 57.
Michael K. Powell, Comm‟r, FCC, The Public Interest Standard: A New
Regulator‟s Search for Enlightenment, American Bar Association 17th Annual Legal
Forum on Communications Law (Apr. 5, 1998), available at http://transition.
fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/spmkp806.html (“Technology has evaporated any meaningful
distinctions among distribution medi[a], making it unsustainable for the courts to
segregate broadcasting from other medi[a] for First Amendment purposes. It is just
fantastic to maintain that the First Amendment changes as you click through the channels
on your television set.”).
126
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
125
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fifty-three percent (53%) of the parents responded that the
government should regulate broadcast and cable in the same
way,127 and why there were no substantive differences across
delivery systems in parental perception of unwanted content.128
On a basic level, television consumption is largely homogenous
across delivery systems.
If the FCC‟s content-based regulations are ultimately deemed
unconstitutional, there will likely be an even stronger private
demand for media filters. Parents want to take control of filtering,
and are concerned about the amount of exposure that their children
have to undesirable content. The most effective media filters will
likely be the ones that are conspicuous within normal consumer
television use. Similarly, consumers will be more likely to
understand regulations that are based on principles of consumer
transparency.
CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court has the opportunity to re-evaluate
content-based broadcast regulation, the justices should turn to
empirical evidence to help answer two critical First Amendment
questions. First, is broadcast television still so uniquely pervasive
that parents lack control over the content that their children watch?
The results from this study strongly suggest that it is not; parents in
broadcast households do not have significantly different
perceptions of control than parents in households with MPVD
services. Therefore, the age of Pacifica is over, and intermediate
scrutiny should be abandoned in the broadcast context.
Second, are media filters an effective, less restrictive means of
helping these parents control inappropriate content on television
from reaching their children? The data show that parents
overwhelmingly believe media filter technology is an effective
alternative to government regulation. And self-help technology is

127

In fact, another twenty-two percent (22%) of respondents believed that the
government should regulate cable more than it currently does, although not as strictly as
broadcast.
128
See supra Section IV.A.

GAMSE.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

316

2/14/2012 4:52 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 22:287

clearly less restrictive on speech than content-based broadcast
regulation. Therefore, indecency regulation cannot stand up to a
strict scrutiny test.
One important lesson to take from this analysis is that
empirical studies can offer critical insights about the propriety of
media regulation. To that end, there are many avenues for future
study. It would be useful to perform a mixed-mode survey to build
upon these results, and protect against the inherent kinds of bias
that are included with any kind of single-medium study (in this
case, the Internet). Given that the number of broadcast-only
households is dwindling, it could also be appropriate to do a more
focused study that would target that population specifically. Such
studies could help the Court achieve a more robust understanding
of real-world implications when balancing the efficacy of
government speech interests against self-help technology.

APPENDIX
A. Table 1 – Satisfaction with Control Over Unwanted Content
Question: How satisfied are you with your ability to control
your children‟s access to TV programming that you don‟t want
your children to watch?
Broadcast
Only

Cable, Fiber, Satellite, or
Multiple

Satisfied

77%

85%

Not Satisfied

23%

15%

N: 526
Fisher‟s Exact Sig.: 0.224
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Question: How satisfied are you with the government‟s
regulation of programming that you don‟t want your children
to watch?

Satisfied
Not Satisfied

Broadcast
Only

Cable, Fiber, Satellite, or
Multiple

41.7%
58.3%

61.5%
38.5%

N: 478
Fisher‟s Exact Sig: 0.022
B. Table 2 – Pervasiveness of Unwanted Content
Question: How concerned are you that your children are being
exposed to too much . . . Violent content on television?

Not
Concerned
Concerned

Broadcast
Only

Cable, Fiber, Satellite, or
Multiple

22.2%

21.6%

77.8%

78.4%

N: 545
Fisher‟s Exact Sig: 1.000
Sexual content on television?

Not
Concerned
Concerned

Broadcast
Only

Cable, Fiber, Satellite, or
Multiple

22.2%

18.3%

77.8%

81.7%

N: 544
Fisher‟s Exact Sig.: 0.512
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Adult language on television?

Not
Concerned
Concerned

Broadcast
Only

Cable, Fiber, Satellite, or
Multiple

27.8%

27.4%

72.2%

72.6%

N: 544
Fisher‟s Exact Sig.: 1.000
Question: How much inappropriate content do you think your
children are exposed to on TV?

A Lot
Some
Only a Little
None at All

Broadcast
Only

Cable, Fiber, Satellite, or
Multiple

27%
38%
22%
14%

25%
44%
24%
7%

N: 536
Pearson‟s Chi Square Sig.: 0.428
C. Table 3 – V-Chip Usage
Question: Have you or another adult in your houseful ever
programmed your V-Chip to block shows you don‟t want your
children to watch?
2011
2007
(This Study) (Kaiser)

2004
(Kaiser)

2001
(Kaiser)

Yes, Have Used VChip

12%

16%

15%

7%

No, Have Not
Used V-Chip / Not
Sure

38%

21%

20%

12%
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Not Aware TV Has
V-Chip

36%

45%

39%

21%

Did Not Purchase
New TV Since
1/1/00

14%

18%

26%

60%

N: 560
D. Table 4 - Usefulness of Media Filters
Question: Some people have TV parental controls other than
the V-chip that allows them to block certain shows or channels
. . . How often do you use these other devices?
Cable
Box

DVR

Satellite
Box

Other

Use

71%

77%

63%

34%

Never use

29%

23%

37%

66%

N

276

304

258

202

Question: How useful have these screening devices been in
blocking programming that you don‟t want your children to
watch?

At least
somewhat useful
N

V-Chip

Cable
Box

DVR

Satellite
Box

Other

98%

70%

70%

67%

47%

69

234

237

189

141
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E. Table 5 – Future Television Content Regulation
Question: Some people say that the availability of content
filtering technology like the V-chip means that the government
should not need to continue to regulate broadcast TV
programming for ____, regardless of filtering technology like
the V-chip. How do you think technology like the V-chip
should affect broadcast regulations for ____.*
Obscenity
Gov‟t Should Relax Regs
b/c of Tech
Gov‟t Should Relax Regs
for Other Reasons
Gov‟t Should Continue to
Regulate
TOTAL
N

Indecency Profanity

18%

18%

21%

14%

15%

16%

67%

67%

63%

100%
468

100%
469

100%
475

*Respondents were presented with FCC definitions for obscenity,
indecency, and profanity. For those definitions, see supra note 14.
Note: A significant number of respondents (about 12%) answered
“don‟t know” for each of these questions.
F. Table 6 – Technology as an Alternative to Regulation
Question: To what extent do you believe that technology like
the V-chip is an effective alternative to government regulation
of TV programming that you don‟t want your children to
watch?
Much more effective
More effective
Equally effective
Less effective
Much less effective
N: 456

15%
30%
36%
14%
5%
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Note: A significant number of respondents (about 17%) answered
“don‟t know” for this question.

